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After the profound international political and economic change followed by financial 
crisis, the global power has shifted gradually from the West to the East. The rise of global 
protectionism, unilateralism and nationalism led by the US is constantly challenging the 
existing international systems. As a new rising power, China has made proactive efforts to 
exert its role in the international arena, and has started to show its ambitions in internati-
onal relations with the “Belt and Road Initiative” in 2013, aiming to build the connectivity 
between China and Europe, two great players in global economy. 
In 2012, China took the initiative to establish the economic cooperation with Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries under “16+1” framework, as a sub-strategy of Belt 
and Road Initiative, which provoked a heated debate among Europe. The co-existence of 
economic interests and political concerns from China’s engagement in CEECs lead to the 
different responses from the EU member states. The questions remain that what are the 
responses from the EU institutions and its implications for the further China’s economic 
cooperation with the CEE.
1. Introduction
In 2012, “16+1” institutional cooperation was established in Warsaw to deepen the relation 
between China and the 16 CEE countries, which is integrated as a part of the BRI (Belt & Road 
Initiative). With the close political ties between China and CEE countries, more investments and 
construction projects were delivered in this region. Chinese engagement in CEE has aroused 
heated debates from both academic and political fields about whether it is compatible or in clash 
with the EU interests. Furthermore, as Chinese MNCs have conducted remarkable number of 
M&A deals in the key sectors such as technology and infrastructure, it provoked great concerns 
among the political observers and policymakers. 
As the deepest integration actor in the world so far, the CEE member states still show great 
economic dependence on Western EU members, and member states are still facing EU instit-
1 CEE countries refer to 16 countries with 11 EU member states Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania Slovakia, and Slovenia and five non-EU countries: Serbia, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro.
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utional constraints when dealing with the third countries (Zhang, 2018). Therefore, the trans-
regional cooperation is faced up with a dilemma during the implementation. The investment 
growth didn’t sustain even though the China-CEE political ties have entered the best period. 
This paper aims to study how the EU responds towards the China-CEE cooperation and what are 
the implications for Chinese investments in this region with special focus on the infrastructure 
construction and foreign investments from institutional and political economic perspective. 
2. Patterns and Motivations of Chinese Economic Engagement 
in CEE
Plenty of researches reveal different opinions of scholars and experts on the motivations in 
which factors drive the Chinese investment in CEE countries. The push and pull factors of Chi-
na-CEE cooperation will be collected and summarized based on the literature review from both 
Chinese and Western scholars.
Firstly, the policy of “going global” put forward by Chinese government in 2000, encouraging 
Chinese domestic firms to engage in the overseas investment to obtain the maximum profits 
and improve its competitiveness (Szunomar, 2016). With such a strategic orientation, China 
pushed state-owned and private companies to pursue the overseas investment opportunities, 
making China a major capital-exporter. What’s more, the fast-growing economy and large fo-
reign exchange reserve are supporting China to invest in the EU (Fan, 2014). In addition, the 
commercial motivations also push China to engage in the Europe in order to acquire technology, 
know-how, and brands and circumvent the trade barriers (Wade, 2014). In recent years, the 
project B&R initiative and ‘16+1’ framework have enhanced the bilateral cooperation between 
China and CEE.
From the perspective of CEE countries, they provide incentives for FDI via tax-concession, 
tariffs-abolition, the settlement of free economic zones, and the avoidance of double taxation 
(Haico et al, 2010). What’s more, other opinions especially from Western European countries 
are that China is transferring their politics and values via economic cooperation. More than two 
third of Chinese outward FDI in Europe comes from state-owned enterprises, which links to 
political goals instead of economic interests (Davis et al, 2016). 
The Chinese investment in the EU has a dramatic growth in the last decades from less than 
5,000 million USD in 2008 to 70,000 million USD in 2017, with the takeovers in the EU reached 
a record volume of approximately EUR 20 billion (MOFCOM, 2017). In terms of investment 
mode, 94% of the total investments are conducted through acquisition (Rhodium group, 2017).
And the annual value of completed Chinese FDI transactions in the EU increased to 37.2 
billion EUR in 2016, which is more than 15 times of it in 2010. However, it has declined after 
2016 (see figure 1) as a result of capital control from Chinese government and tighter scrutiny of 
foreign investment throughout the EU. 
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Figure 1. Annual value of completed Chinese FDI transactions in the EU-28, EUR billion
Source: Rhodium group, 2019
Meanwhile, recent years have seen an increase of Chinese FDI in the CEE countries. The figure 
2 shows the investment trend from China to CEE-7 countries with total volume from 227 million 
USD in 2006 to 1530 million USD in 2016 (MOFCOM, 2018), and Hungary is the top destination 
for Chinese FDI among others. It is worth mentioning that there are huge data differences from 
different data sources such as OECD, Eurostata. Chinese investment in this region is driven by 
favorable economic environment, institutional stability, and EU single markets (Szunomár, 2014). 
Figure 2. Chinese OFDI in 7 CEE Countries (Million USD)
Source: MOFCOM, 2018
Regarding to the sectoral distribution, Chinese investment fields involve transport, energy, 
tourism and housing estate etc., ICT, transport, utilities and infrastructure have become the top 
sectors for Chinese investment in Europe in 2017 (Rhodium group, 2017).
3. EU Responses toward Chinese Investment
According to the speeches of government officials, European diplomats believed that Chine-
se government needs international support for the hot territorial issues such as the dispute on 
South China Sea, Taiwan and Tibet. For example, Hungary and Greece refused to criticize Chi-
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na, and some countries which are also faced up the maritime issues didn’t express strong stand 
on South China Sea issue (Emmott, 2016).
The voice from government officials reveals the intense criticism from Western EU countries. 
Sigmar Gabriel, the German vice-chancellor and foreign minister, called on Beijing to respect the 
concept of “one Europe” adding that if Europe doesn’t develop a common strategy towards China, 
then China will divide Europe (Yuriy, 2017). Junker (2017) has mentioned that Europe must put 
forward a new framework for investment screening.  If a foreign, state-owned, company wants to pur-
chase a European harbour, part of our energy infrastructure or a defence technology firm, this should 
only happen in transparency, with scrutiny and debate. It is a political responsibility to know what is 
going on in our own backyard so that we can protect our collective security if needed.
From the perspectives of institutional rules, it seems that the EU also takes actions towards 
Chinese economic engagement. The term "EU institutions" in this paper has a broader scope that 
refers to the EU institutional body, EU institutional regulations, rules and norms. EU member 
states have shifted their trade policies to the supranational level. However, the foreign investment 
policies are scattered over both national and supranational level. According to Lisbon Treaty, 
the EU commission has the competence to negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with a 
third country in order to regulate the inward FDI to the member states and protect the European 
outward FDI (Meunier, 2014). Member states respectively hold the BITs with China until an 
EU level bilateral investment treaty is achieved (European Commission, 2013). Nevertheless, 
the EU can use the competition policy3 and common commercial policies to influence Chinese 
economic engagement in the CEE countries regarding to investment projects especially in public 
security and infrastructure fields (Grieger, 2017).
Lots of Chinese infrastructure investments can be hardly delivered due to the potential viola-
tion of the EU competition rules, and public procurement etc.. For example, the project of the ra-
ilway between Budapest and Belgrade is currently under investigation because Brussels suspects 
it may violate EU bidding laws due to lack of transparency (Kynge & Pee, 2017). Another Chine-
se investment project to building motorway A2 in Poland failed after Chinese Overseas Engineer 
Group Co (COVEC) won the tender with the lowest price. One of the important reasons is that 
the investment project failed to comply with the EU regulation such as labor standards and mig-
ration law etc. (Jin. 2015). Lack of the knowledge about the EU rules and regulations is also a big 
challenge for Chinese investments in the European markets. 
What’s more, an important moment is that the key players such as Germany, France call on a 
tighter scrutiny for foreign direct investment regarding to the national security issues and strategic 
assets especially when state-owned enterprises are involved. And EU commission passed a bill to 
establish a common screening framework in 2017 and it will take effect in April, 2019. Under the 
new foreign investment screening mechanism, the member states can further identify the potential 
security threats posed by foreign acquisitions in the key sectors such as infrastructure and techno-
logy (European Commission, 2017). The table shows the recent change of national-level screening 
3 Common competition policy refers to the essential tool to the achievement and maintenance of the single 
market. It ensures the competitive conduct of undertakings (firms, companies, businesses) and protects the 
interests of consumers by enabling them to procure goods and services on the best terms. It promotes economic 
efficiency by creating a climate favourable to innovation and technical progress
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framework since 2017 in some member states. The big member states such as France and Germany 
expand the scope for defining the critical sectors related to security concerns and strengthen their 
control for foreign acquisition. Czech Republic started to consider setting this mechanism. Howe-
ver, Hungary established it in 2018 to respond the EU’s proposal (Hanemann et al, 2019). 
Table 3. National-level screening mechanisms and changes sin
ce 2017 
 Source: MERICS and Rhodium Group research, 2019
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4. Case Studies
Two case studies about Chinese engagement in Hungary are elaborated in this paper to explore 
to what extent the EU institutions can affect the implementation of Chinese investment projects. 
One case is Budapest–Belgrade railway and another case is Huawei Technologies Co, Ltd, which 
represent the infrastructure and technologic sectors.  However, compared with Huawei, it is worth 
mentioning that Budapest-Belgrade railway is not a foreign investment but a loan-based construc-
tion which is financed by Chinese credits. The loan-based infrastructure construction has concer-
ned the EU regarding to the debt diplomacy issues between China and the CEE members.
 We also adopted  political economic approach to provide more comprehensive about the 
EU’s responses towards Chinese economic engagement especially investment in CEE regions 
besides the institutional perspectives based on several reasons: First of all, the attitudes towards 
new rising power from the Western countries are complicated which might include the regula-
tive constraints as well as ideological and political concerns, since Chinese presence has always 
been a hot issue in international political economic field. Economic nationalism can be used 
as the theory in this article to explain why host countries, or especially the EU tries to limit the 
influence of foreign investors for the good of domestic economic actors (Gilpin, 1975). Besides, 
the host governments tend to adopt the political, bureaucratic and institutional factors to limit 
the foreign companies in order to win more support from nationalists (Krugman, 1987).
4.1 Budapest-Belgrade Railway
The around 350km long Budapest-Belgrade railway is the pilot project under the “16+1” platform, 
which connects the capitals between Hungary and Serbia. The infrastructure project is part of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative by linking the Greek Port of Piraeus with other European cities as the map shows. 
The project is financed by Chinese Export-Import bank with 3 billion USD loans at 2-3 % of interest rate 
(Ferchen et al, 2018). The Hungarian section of the railway takes USD 2.1 billion, of which 85% financed 
by Chinese EXIM Bank with 20-year loan base. Chinese-Hungarian Railway Non-profit Ltd co-organized 
by China Railway Group and Hungarian Railways (MÁV) is responsible for the projects (Suokas 2017).
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This project was officially put in agreements among the three parties in 2014 and expected to 
be completed in 20234. However, the project on the Hungarian side has been suspended while the 
Serbian parts of the project started according to the agreements. The suspension of the Budapest 
section of the railway project partially attributes to the investigations from the EU commission in 
terms of procurement, bidding laws even anti-corruption regulation (Liu, 2017). From the pers-
pective of the EU, it is believed that this project implies geoeconomic and geopolitical goals based 
on several reasons: this infrastructure project has been symbolized as China’s political leverage wit-
hin the EU through economic means, and policy makers and think tank in Europe thinks that the 
railway cooperation with China is part of political goals for Orban government to build its illiberal 
democratic system in Hungary5, which will harm the EU norms and values. Second, based on the 
political economic approach, the infrastructure construction in the CEE countries is mainly finan-
ced by the EU structural fund and then contracted to the Western companies (Oehler-Șinca et al. 
2017). However, Chinese presence in the CEE infrastructure market will potentially harm the EU 
economic interests. For example, the increasing number of Chinese infrastructure projects in non-
EU CEE countries attracts the attention from the Western EU and “Berlin process” was launched 
by the EU under the EU's Connectivity Agenda for the Western Balkans (EU parliament, 2018). 
And the EU institution voiced Chinese concessional loans are not favourable and competitive 
compared with the EU funds with 2-3 percentage of interest rate which aroused criticism from 
scholars and other officials (Chen, 2018). The debt-financed projects will put the small economies 
vulnerable towards the fiscal instabilities in Balkan countries. Based on the constraints from the EU 
institutional rules, many Chinese infrastructure investments can’t be delivered as expected even 
with the close political and economic ties between China and CEE countries (Eder et al, 2018). 
4.2 Huawei in Hungary
The IT giant company of China, Huawei, established its representative office in 2005 with 1.2 
billion dollars and then built its distribution centre in Budapest in 2009.  It has achieved great success 
since its arrival and over 70 percent of the Hungarian population has used its mobile telecommunica-
tion equipment and services 6. The Hungarian government signed a strategic partnership agreement 
with Huawei in 2013 and MOU of building a 5G network infrastructure in 20187. However, it has 
been a hot topic in Western countries concerning national security issues. Currently the US has char-
ged the company for several suspected crimes such as technology theft from T-mobile and violation 
of the sanction on Iran. Besides, the US has call on other allies such as the European countries to take 
measures to hinder the development of Huawei 5G network, which creates great trouble for Huawei 
in other host countries for its 5G developments in spite of lack of evidence for the charge. 
4 “The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries,” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2014
5 Benner et al., “Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe.”





After the political backlashes against Huawei from Australia, the USA and Canada, the attitudes 
within the EU are less aggressive and more divided.  Under the pressure of the US, German Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel responds "Security, particularly when it comes to the expansion of the 5G network, 
but also elsewhere in the digital area, is a very important concern for the German government, so we are 
defining our standards for ourselves, We will also discuss these questions with our partners in Europe, as 
well as the appropriate offices in the United States."(Sourav, 2019). The Western big EU members are 
more cautious and tighten their regulations based on a rule-based approach. Poland and Czech Re-
public are more objective towards Huawei (Patricolo, 2018). In particular, the EU has put the relevant 
issues specific to the key investment sectors related to critical infrastructure and national security into 
the new framework in the documents8. The Actions 9 and 10 below are quite relevant for Chinese 
investment and mention 5G network without actually indicating Huawei. However, as one of the 
best telecommunication companies, Huawei has a leading and ground-breaking innovation of 5G 
networks and aims to provide the world with better internet service.
Action 9: To safeguard against potential serious security implications for critical digital infrast-
ructure, a common EU approach to the security of 5G networks is needed. To kick start this, the 
European Commission will issue a Recommendation following the European Council.
Action 10: To detect and raise awareness of security risks posed by foreign investment in critical 
assets, technologies and infrastructure, Member States should ensure the swift, full and effective imp-
lementation of the Regulation on screening of foreign direct investment (EU commission, 2019).
However, Hungarian government provides a stable and friendly environment for the future 
development of this Chinese company by supporting its 5G network in Hungary disregarding 
the warning from the USA9. The success of Huawei in Hungary is part of Orban’s “East Opening 
Policy” and Hungarian government wouldn’t take a risk to destroy the current political relations 
with China by curbing Huawei 5G application. 
5. Conclusion
To some extent, China’s investment in Europe took the window opportunity of the Euro crisis but 
it has a long term strategic cooperation under the BRI and “16+1” platform. And bilateral coopera-
tion between China and CEE countries provoked anxiety and tension among the EU because they 
believe the institutionalized cooperation between these two parties will make it harder for EU mem-
ber states to achieve common China policy. Meanwhile, the EU institution can restrain the national 
policy choices toward a third country from political, economic and institutional perspectives (Jin, 
2015). The future trend of Chinese investments in the EU will be affected based on the big share of 
acquisition economic activities and relevant sectors covered by the investment screening procedures. 
As for Chinese engagement in the CEE especially in Hungary, the infrastructure construction will be 
under the watch from the EU institutional rules and the implementation process can be delayed or 
even suspended. However, the individual member states are more decisive in implementing the in-
vestment screening framework when dealing with the foreign investments. Due to the good political 
8 “European Commission contribution to the European Council EU-China – A strategic outlook”
9 Sherisse Pham, (2019):  The US is stepping up pressure on Europe to ditch Huawei. CNN business. Avai-
lable at:https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/11/tech/huawei-mike-pompeo-hungary/index.html
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relations, Hungary will continue to support current Chinese investments or infrastructure project 
and attract more Chinese investments. However, Hungarian government can use the framework and 
the EU institutional rules as a leverage to introduce more Greenfield investments instead of acquisiti-
on activities for its own benefits since the investment screening procedure targets at M&A and Hun-
gary lacks for the key technology for Chinese investment to acquire. 
The future negotiation of ongoing bilateral investment treaty between the EU and China is 
quite important for the China-CEE cooperation where the EU member states should achieve a 
common ground toward Chinese investment. However, there are a lot of requirements and stan-
dards which put the Chinese side in disadvantage when it comes to market access. The Chinese 
government will probably have to make a concession in order to achieve the treaties. Besides, there 
are a lot of tools that the EU can adopt to restrict Chinese FDI in Europe and the US has already 
taken measures to control Chinese national companies under the claim of national security, fair 
market access and technological transfers etc. (Zhang, 2018). In such a context of global situation, 
the uncertainties and challenges increase further for the future Chinese economic engagement in 
CEE countries. The EU should deal with Chinese investment objectively and rationally to avoid the 
same political backlashes against China which will further lead to global protectionism.  
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